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In the early morning hours of December 20, 1989, the United States invaded
Panama. First came the air attack; Stealth bombers and other warplanes dropped
422 bombs. Then 24,000 American troops assaulted Panama City.
Two weeks later, General Manuel Noriega-the "maximum leader" of Pan-
ama, a ruthless dictator and a reputed international drug kingpin-surrendered to
American forces. Jubilant crowds teemed into the streets of Panama to celebrate
what Panamanian Vice President Ricardo Calderon termed "[ojur full liberation
from the dictatorship of Noriega," and in Washington President Bush announced
that America's objectives had been achieved. More than 500 people had been
killed in the invasion, including hundreds of civilians; thousands were seriously
wounded.
Although the invasion and the arrest of General Noriega were popular, many
lawyers found them disturbing. President Bush ordered massive military action
without congressional approval; the invasion violated the charters of both the
Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations; and, in part, the
United States invaded another country to arrest someone on foreign soil. From
the time the invasion began, there have been vigorous debates over whether the
invasion and the arrest of General Noriega violated statutory law, constitutional
law or international law-and even whether the conduct of foreign policy should
be constrained by legal considerations.
On the second day of the invasion, President Bush sent Congress a report
explaining his reasons for the action. Although he did not formally recognize its
validity, the President's report nevertheless complied with the requirement of the
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War Powers Resolution' that the President report to Congress within forty-eight
hours of introducing armed forces into hostilities.
Congress enacted that legislation in 1973-after President Nixon had unilat-
erally ordered military action in Laos and Cambodia, and over his veto--"to
fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution . . . and insure that the
collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the
introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities. . . ." The Resolu-
tion requires that unless Congress declares war or specifically authorizes military
action (or cannot meet because of an attack on the United States), the President
must terminate use of the armed forces within sixty days of submitting his report.
But the War Powers Resolution does not merely require the President to report
to Congress after the fact; the President must consult Congress "in every pos-
sible instance" before involving American troops in hostilities.
Was it possible for the President to consult Congress before the invasion? In
his message to Congress, President Bush said that he acted for four reasons: to
safeguard American lives; to help restore democracy; to protect the integrity of
the Panama Canal Treaty; and to bring General Noriega to justice.
A need to protect American lives can be a compelling reason to act quickly and
without warning. Noriega's troops were repeatedly harassing American military
personnel, and just days before the invasion they killed a U.S. Marine. But the
14,000 American soldiers already stationed in Panama were capable of protect-
ing themselves and other Americans, as well as the canal. More lives would be
saved by restricting Americans to U.S. bases than by sending them into combat.
There was no impediment to Congress' debating whether to go to war to
protect democracy in Panama or the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaty; in fact,
those are precisely the kind of issues appropriate for congressional debate. Per-
haps Noriega would have been harder to capture if he had been forewarned, but
arresting someone is not a matter of vital national interest.
Indeed, if President Bush really invaded Panama to capture Noriega, there is
reason to worry whether he was overly influenced by anger and hubris. Noriega
had thumbed his nose at the United States: he double-crossed the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Agency for which he had been an operative; he suspended the
results of the May 1989 election, giving as his excuse a news report that Pres-
ident Bush had authorized $10 million in covert aid to the opposition candidate;
he survived a coup, while U.S. troops stood by indecisively; and his National
Assembly declared that "a state of war" existed between Panama and the United
States. The more brazen Noriega's actions, the more Bush was subjected to the
insult he most resents-being called a "wimp."
Even President Bush may not be sure whether he acted partly out of pique.
When Congress declares war-by majorities in the two separate houses-there
is less of a chance of being propelled by emotion.
1. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1988).
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President Bush could have consulted Congress before ordering the invasion of
Panama, and therefore he violated the War Powers Resolution. Some argue,
however, that the Resolution is unconstitutional because it attempts to unduly
restrict presidential authority; they contend that the President's inherent powers
are sufficient for him to have ordered the Panama invasion on his own authority.
Article II, section 1 vests the "executive Power" in the President and makes
him the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Article I, section 8 gives
Congress the power to "declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and
make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water." Those who favor presi-
dential power contend that because the framers deliberately decided (by a vote of
7-2) to use the words "declare war" rather than "make war," they must not have
intended to give Congress the exclusive prerogative to make war. To this they add
the fact that the Constitution gives Congress "[a]ll legislative Powers herein
granted" 2 -thereby limiting congressional power to the expressly enumerated
list-but vests an "executive Power" without any similar restriction in the
President.3 They conclude that the President has all powers not specifically
granted to the other branches, including the power to make war.
But it is a forced argument. The Constitution does not recognize a power to
"make war," and the attempt to fashion a distinction between making war and
declaring war is made out of whole cloth. The only war power is given to
Congress. The framers did not play semantic games with the Constitution, ex-
pecting lawyers to play hide and seek with words used and not used. A reading
that strains to magnify the powers granted to the President and diminish those
vested in Congress is an exercise in advocacy, not constitutional interpretation.
It is often suggested that while Congress has the authority to declare a full-
scale war, the President, as Commander-in-Chief, may engage U.S. troops in
lesser conflicts. But constitutional scholars report that when the framers gave
Congress "the power to issue letters of marque and reprisal, they referred to the
power to authorize a broad spectrum of armed hostilities short of declared war." 4
Moreover, it is hard to argue that ordering 24,000 American troops into combat
against the armed forces of Panama was not tantamount to declaring war.
A second argument for presidential power is precedent. Presidents have sent
American troops into combat situations 212 times while Congress has declared
war only seven times. Certainly the constitutional plan has not consistently been
followed, but the Constitution is not rewritten by ignoring it.
A third argument is necessity. The modem world is increasingly dangerous;
we must contend with ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism,
and a host of other perils. Most agree that the President has the authority born of
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
3. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 704-05 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 444 U.S. 996
(1979) (President has the power to abrogate treaties).
4. Jules Lobel, Covert War and Congressional Authority: Hidden War and Forgotten Power,
134 U. PA. L. REv. 1035, 1046 (1986).
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necessity, that he can act when there is not time for congressional action or when
public debate would destroy the ability to act. The President must act if the
United States is attacked suddenly, and, for example, President Carter could not
have been expected to ask Congress for authority to order American commandos
to free the American hostages held in Tehran. But the necessity argument cannot
give the President more powers than necessity requires-and it was simply not
necessary for the President to invade Panama without consulting Congress.
When the President ordered the invasion of Panama, therefore, he violated the
War Powers Resolution and he exceeded his constitutional authority.
He also violated treaty commitments. The OAS Charter, which both the
United States and Panama signed, provides: "The territory of a State is invio-
lable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of
other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any
grounds whatever." (Emphasis added.) The U.N. Charter requires members to
"refrain . . .from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state."
The OAS condemned the American invasion of Panama by a vote of 20-1, the
U.N. by 75-20.
There is nothing in the Panama Canal Treaty that permitted the United States
to invade Panama, notwithstanding the President's rhetoric of acting to protect
the "integrity" of that treaty. (Note the deft use of language; President Bush said
he acted "to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaties" 5 rather than to
protect the canal or to act in accordance with the treaty, thereby blurring any
specific meaning.)
One court has held that the President may unilaterally terminate a treaty,6 and
there is even some authority for the proposition that the President may disregard
international law when he deems it necessary to the national interest to do so.
7
These are by no means established principles of law, although it is settled law that
the President has "plenary and exclusive power ...as the sole organ of the
federal government in the field of international relations .. ." 8
Yet even this power, "like every other governmental power, must be exercised
in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution." 9 Treaties are,
under article VI of the Constitution, the supreme law of the land. Abrogating a
treaty is one thing, but violating it is something else entirely; it is the difference
between changing a law and disregarding it. Moreover, President Bush did not
purport to terminate the Panama treaty; he said he acted to protect its integrity,
and he certainly did not intend to terminate the United States' commitment to
the OAS and U.N. Charters.
5. N.Y. TmS, Jan. 4, 1990, at A12, col. 5.
6. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 996.
7. See Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1455 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 889
(1986).
8. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
9. Id.
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Perhaps the most interesting legal aspect of the Panama invasion involves the
arrest of General Noriega. In 1988, two federal grand juries indicted Noriega for
conspiring to distribute narcotics in the United States. No one denies that it is
desirable to bring alleged drug traffickers to trial, but is the rule of law served by
invading another country to make an arrest?
The question has been asked before. In May of 1960, an Israeli commando
team secretly made its way into Argentina, kidnapped Adolf Eichmann, and
spirited him back to Israel to stand trial for crimes against humanity and the
Jewish people. Both Eichmann and Noriega were charged with committing
crimes completely outside the jurisdiction that indicted them--that is, Israel tried
Eichmann for crimes he committed in Germany and the United States indicted
Noriega for crimes he committed in Panama-although in both instances the
crimes affected citizens of the indicting nation. And both Eichmann and Noriega
were captured by force on the soil of another sovereign nation, although Eich-
mann was abducted without loss of life.
Following Eichmann's abduction, Argentina instituted a proceeding against
Israel in the United Nations but it later withdrew it in return for an apology.
Because only nations have standing to speak in international law, there was no
one left to demand that Eichmann be returned to Argentina. Panama also chose
not to contest the Noriega arrest; those succeeding him to power in Panama had
political reasons for not wanting him returned.
Of course, Eichmann and Noriega argued that the charges against them should
be dismissed because they had been brought before the court by illegal means.
But it is United States law, and that of most other nations as well, that the
"body" of defendant is never suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest; that
is, an illegal arrest does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to try the defendant.
Noriega conceded this principle, but argued that an exception exists when, in the
words of a Second Circuit case, the arrest involves "the government's deliber-
ate, unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the accused's constitutional
rights." 10 But only violations of the accused's constitutional rights are relevant,
and Noriega could not maintain that he, himself, had been mistreated.
The Eichmann court reached a similar result. Yet there is something troubling
here. Writing at the time of the Eichmann trial, one commentator said:
Whatever sympathy lies with Israel for the crimes committed against her people and
whatever moral justification there may have been, to those who firmly believe that the
future of the world depends upon the ability of men and nations to lay down and follow
positive rules for peaceful conduct among themselves, the bad taste of kidnapping, of
achieving justice through an unlawful act, still remains. "
The idea of bringing Eichmanns and Noriegas to trial may be appealing, but
scoundrels are not the only ones at risk. The Iranian parliament has, for example,
10. United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1530 (S.D. Fla. 1990), quoting United States
v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275 (2d Cir. 1974).
11. Zad Leavy, The Eichmann Trial and the Role of Law, 48 A.B.A. J. 820, 822 (1962).
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enacted legislation authorizing Iranian officials to arrest Americans anywhere in
the world for violations of Iranian law.
The hard question is not whether the invasion of Panama and the arrest of
General Noriega were lawful. They were not. The hard question is why foreign
policy should be constrained by law at all. After all, the Panama invasion freed
Panama from a despot, gave it the opportunity to reestablish democracy, and
brought an international drug kingpin to justice.
International law often seems little more than a trap for the naive. We live in
a dangerous world-a world with Stalins, Hitlers, Khomenis, Saddam Hus-
seins, and swarms of lilliputian imitators such as Manuel Noriega. How can Good
shackle itself to the law while Bad runs free?
Across the spectrum of ideology, Americans began to lose faith in interna-
tional law. Speaking to the ABA's Section of International Law and Practice,
conservative Jeane Kirkpatrick said that unilateral compliance with international
law is a "suicide pact"; writing in the New Republic liberal Charles Krautham-
mer pronounced international law "an ass," adding: "It has nothing to offer.
Foreign policy is best made without it." 12
The Panama invasion came at low ebb for America's faith in international law.
Just one year later America was at war in the Persian Gulf. If the chronology of
the two events were reversed-that is, if Iraq's seizure of Kuwait and the
ensuing events had come first-the United States may well have seen things
differently.
For despite the horrible consequences of war, the experience in the Persian
Gulf taught many lessons.
It taught that the Constitution (and the War Powers Resolution) can work. The
President can ask Congress to authorize military action, and Congress can re-
spond. Indeed, Congress can debate the wisdom of going to war, and even after
a close vote the nation can join together and act forcefully.
It showed that international law does not require helplessness. The coalition's
action did not violate precepts of international law, which recognize the rights of
states to defend themselves, individually and collectively, and to come to the aid
of those being treated in a way that shocks the conscience.
It demonstrated that nations cannot always violate international law with im-
punity. Transgressors can be punished.
It renewed faith in the United Nations, and it even created hope for a new
world order.
These are still nascent concepts, and international law can impose frustrating
constraints. When a nation possesses both moral authority and military might,
why should it be crippled by international law? Why suffer a Noriega when there
is the power to remove him?
12. DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 133 (1990).
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Perhaps there is no better answer than the one given by Robert Bolt in his
famous play, A Manfor All Seasons. At one point in the play Sir Thomas More's
friend, Roper, says that he would "cut down every law in England" to get at the
Devil. Sir Thomas More responds:
Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you-where
would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? This country's planted thick with laws
from coast to coast-man's laws, not God's-and if you cut them down-and you'rejust the man to do it-d'you really think you could stand upright in the winds that
would blow then?13
Sometimes it's necessary to resist eliminating a Manuel Noriega-not for his
sake, but for the rule of law.
13. Robert Bolt, A Man for All Seasons 38 (Vintage ed. 1960).
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